173
6
APPENDIX III.
Decypher of Telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, China, No. 54, dated May 6, 1927.
YOUR No. 790.
I do not agree with policy outlined in Mr. B. C. Newton's No. 138. British Concession and all other British property, Chingkiang, having been entirely evacuated, it is obviously impossible to defend same except by a large military force as at Shanghai.
As regards retaliatory measures, Chingkiang is strongly fortified, and has been scene of artillery duel between Chiang and Sun for the past week. Forts on both sides would have to be dealt with before any other offensive action taken.
"
In my opinion, there is less reason to take strong ["measures omitted] at Chingkiang than at any other concession in China, and certainly not before dealing with Hankow.
As a military operation, difficulties of landing troops [are] far greater [than at Hankow owing to strength [and] position, [ forts] and [? silting] up of harbour. In view of above, Consul-General, Shanghai, and G.O.C. and myself do not recommend either direct [or] retaliatory measures there at present. 1520/6.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.